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April 23, 1990

•

In August 1982, Mexico announced that it was unable to meet its debt
obligations then falling due.

Since this announcement more than 40 countries

have been forced to reschedule on debt owed to commercial banks.

Commercial

banks have been criticized for blindly providing the lesser developed
countries (LOCs) more credit and exposing themselves to more and more risk.
For example, six months prior to Mexico's announcement that it could not meet
its debt obligations, Mexico had been granted 6.4 billion dollars in new loans
to make a total of 84 billion dollars in loans that needed to be rescheduled.
If commercial banks had had more information on the credit risk of the LDCs,
they could have foreseen such an event and taken some precautions, such as
curtailing lending, to minimize their losses.

Increased information on the

riskiness of LOC debt could be extremely useful to commercial banks when
making lending decisions or provisions.

The purpose of this research is to

estimate the risk associated with LOC debt, and to determine the variables
which are significant in assessing this risk.
The discussion begins in Section II with an introduction to the "debt
crisis" and an explanation of the various developments causing this situation.
Following this causal analysis is a discussion of some of the proposed
solutions that have been developed and the success some of these proposed
solutions have had.

Section II ends with a brief review of previous

econometric work done on debt-servicing capacity and some discussion of the
shortcomings of these models.

Section III includes a discussion of the model

this paper uses to assess country risk or the probability of default, and
Section IV presents the results of the model.

Finally, Section V summarizes

the results and suggests some of the model's potential uses.
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Section I I

Over lending

to underdeveloped countries began during the 1970's.

Until

the 1970's, banks' involvement with LOCs was limited to the provision of
short-term trade finance facilities.

After this period banks found LDC

lending attractive for various reasons (which will be presented shortly), and
started increasing their loans to developing countries
1983, U.S

at a rapid rate.

By

commercial banks owned over half of the 700 billion dollar debt

owed by these developing countries.

Luckily, banks have been able to carry

their LOC loans at book value rather than market value.

The average estimated

secondary market price, as of July 1987, was between 45 and 55 dollars per 100
dollars of debt, and had commercial banks been required to carry this debt at
market value, six of the largest banks would have defaulted (Exhibit 1) (Sachs
409).
The world banking system is only one of the parties being adversely
affected by the crisis.

LOCs also face grave difficulties

because external

debt obligations conflict with developmental needs. The large magnitude of
debt these countries face, and the service payments on these debts, drains LDC
resources which could otherwise have been used for internal development.
are now in the position of borrowing additional capital just to meet

LDCs

service

obligations.
Repayment problems have been attributed, in large part, to adverse
developments in the international economy.
in 1973 was one such development.

OPEC's quadrupling of oil prices

The oil importing developing countries

found themselves unable to pay for these higher fuel prices from their own
revenues.

At the same time the current account balance of the oil exporting
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countries jumped from seven billion dollars in 1973 to 68 billion dollars in
1974.

These surpluses found their

way into banks worldwide and hence the

banking community was awash with liquidity at a time when there was a large
scale demand for credit on the part of the LOGs.

This combined with the fact

that banks could not lend to their traditional borrowers in industrial
countries due to the global recession, triggered the lending boom (Makin 27).
Another adverse development facing the LOGs during the 1970's was the
surge of inflation in the industrial countries, particularly the United
States.

Inflation in industrial countries rose from a 1963-1972 average of

4.2% to 11.7% in 1974.

An important consequence of this greater than expected

surge of inflation was a very low, often negative, real rate of interest.

In

order to protect themselves from this, bankers learned to tie rates on LDC
loans to market rates or, failing that, to build a healthy premium into their
lending rates.
forced

From 1977 to 1981 the USA's high domestic interest rates

interest on Euroloans up from 7.8% to 17.5%.

The World Bank estimates

that increases in the interest rates such as LIBOR (London interbank offer
rate) have a profound impact on the debt service requirements of LDGs.

The

latest figure estimates that for a 1% increase in LIBOR the debt of developing
countries increases by 1.9 billion (Makin 22).
also had a large impact on exchange rates.

These higher interest rates

Lured by higher interest rates in

the United States, investors throughout the world switched their funds from
other currencies to the US dollar.
surged.

As a result the dollar exchange rate

This placed another burden on developing countries, as most of their

debt was expressed in dollars. Developing countries found their debt servicing
repayments an even worse drain on their resources than the higher oil prices,
as more and more new loans were necessary to payoff existing debts.
3

LOC export markets declined as well during this period, caused in part by
the global recession, and added to the problems.

In 1981, the combined trade

deficit for oil-importing developing nations was $99 billion.

The average

debt service ratio rose in two years from 17.4% in 1980 to 24.4% in 1982.
Falling prices on raw materials, which are the chief exports of many
developing countries, caused much of the problem. (Kette177).

While they

faced the rising cost of imports, developing countries saw a 25% drop in the
price of raw materials in the period of 1980-1982 alone.

Only countries whose

exports were diversified and not solely raw materials were not hard hit by
this slump.

Increased protectionism in industrial countries also contributed

to the decline in LOC's exports.

Industrial countries, hit by a global

recession, had to struggle with the problem of unemployment and therefore
increasingly resorted to measures designed to defend their economies from
world-market competition.

This increased protectionism among industrial

nations, along with falling raw material prices, created problems for LDCs

in

the adjustment of trade balances.
Not all of the LOC problems are caused by external developments;
inadequate internal economic and political structures

are also to blame.

While the industrial countries are increasingly resistant to price slumps or
drops in demand in the world market, countries with less flexible development
are plunged again and again into crisis.

As Korner sees it, the economic and

social development of the industrial countries was possible only because the
decline of feudalism allowed capitalist structures to form in

industry.

Political power gradually shifted from great landowners to an industrial
working class, which brought about higher wages and social reforms.
Developing countries have not had agrarian reforms or revolutions which would
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have modernized their political structure.

Korner feels this is because

political power remains in the hands of "parasitic oligarchies" and
unproductive state classes.

There is an unequal distribution of income to the

very small upper and middle classes who have very low savings ratios.

The

high incomes of these classes are very lightly taxed as they control much of
the power and can prevent attempts at tax reform or other reforms designed to
bring about a fairer distribution of income.

Rigid traditional social and

political structures prevent economic development in general and the
productive use of foreign capital in particular.

Developing countries also

have few educational and research institutions.

Thus, they remain dependent

on foreign technologically sophisticated goods, which they must import and pay
for partly with foreign loans.

Their financial personnel are also often

poorly trained causing debt management for these countries to be even more
difficult.
Recently, there has also been discussion of capital flight and
adjustment burden this places on LOCs.

the

Several studies have found that

capital flight from LOCs in 1988 has totaled as much as 200 billion dollars
(Lessard 27).

Mexico was perhaps the hardest hit with capital flight totaling

41.8 billion dollars from 1978 to 1982.

Venezuela had similar problems, with

capital flight 29.9 billion dollars during this same period.

Overall the

Latin American countries experienced more capital flight than other developing
nations due to the very unstable currencies in these countries.

Brazil, one

of the largest Latin American debtors, is a unique exception to the phenomena
of capital flight.

The continuity of a competitive exchange rate policy,

avoiding real appreciation, and maintaining tight exchange controls in Brazil,
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was the central element that prevented any significant capital flight (Lessard
44).
Estimates of these magnitudes suggest that reduction in capital flight
could substantially ease the debt burden on developing countries.
causes of capital flight in

One of the

the developing countries has been an

overvaluation of the exchange rate which has led to a fear of devaluation.
This fear of devaluation causes the private sector to shift its funds abroad
to avoid losses due to exchange rate fluctuation.
flight are an exportation of domestic savings

The consequences of capital

and foreign exchange earnings

which leads to shortages of funds for investment and development projects.
This in turn severely hinders potential growth.

Attempts to further develop

and industrialize are impossible without significant capital. Capital flight
financed through external borrowing further increases the debt burden of LDCs.

All of these external developments and internal structural problems have
created a situation in which many of the underdeveloped indebted nations are
not able to meet the service payments on their outstanding debt.

In this

situation, a country may borrow more funds in order to meet its current
payments.

At times, however, this is impossible.

to be rescheduled, forgiven,

It is then that debt needs

or repudiated.

In recent years, help to struggling LDCs has come in the form of debt
rescheduling in order to help them meet their current payments.

These

reschedu1ings are given under the stipulation that the developing countries
follow a stabilization policy as directed

by the IMF (Kette1 155).

The

object of these stabilization programs is to help stimulate the growth needed
in the LDCs in order to help them meet their obligations.
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stabilization programs have recently encountered strong criticism from debtor
nations.

The IMF deflation policies almost invariably lead to recession

(Korner 137).

Argentina is an example of how severely

domestic economic activity.

IMF policies reduce

At the end of a five year stabilization period

the country's gross domestic product was 2% lower than its original level,
while in Portugal economic activity was halved.

The IMF stabilization policy

brought Chile a fall in per capita income of 12.7% and had similar effects in
Peru and Turkey.

It is argued that these programs systematically favor the

industrial countries or creditor nations when developing programs (Korner
131).

While these

policies are in theory a move in the right direction, the

specifics of these programs need to be rethought to bring on more desirable
effects.
Advocates of reformed stabilization programs argue that they should
include more socio-political and institutional reforms.

Korner argues that

selected economic targets will only be met if production-inhibiting land
owning structures are reformed, if the tax system is restructured, and a more
just distribution of income is achieved.

Reforms are needed to stop

mismanagement, corruption and personal privilege to make state enterprises and
public administration more efficient (Korner 177).

In the past, the World

Bank's structural adjustment programs have shown that it is possible to
include such reforms in condition packages.

The task is therefore to create a

political environment which enhances economic growth.
Other proposed solutions have included selling off the debt

at a

discount, for long-term bonds to the IMF, World Bank or creating some new
international fund for such purposes.

While this will help take the risks off

banks, banks will still incur losses, for their loans to LDCs are not worth in
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the secondary market the value banks are carrying on their books.

This

solution can also be viewed as short-term because it does not take into
consideration the need for economic growth.
Debt-to-equity swaps seem to better suited for the situation for they
will encourage economic growth. A debt-to-equity swap involves the commercial
banks and the debtor country forming joint partnerships in businesses within
the debtor nation.

This solution assumes the full cooperation of the debtor

countries in liberalizing

regulations towards direct foreign investment.

New

investment in the financial services sector in the LOCs is well suited for
both banks and the LOCs.

The country's consumers and businesses will gain by

the increased competition in the financial service sector, while the bank
gains new business opportunities in a field of its own expertise (Kettel 140).
This new

direct business relationship will help banks form a long-term

strategic interest with the developing countries.

Not only will banks'

involvement with the local economy enhance their interest in the economic
growth of the country, but the country will gain by having access to new and
varied forms of financial services.
Yet another proposed solution to the debt problem involves trade surplus
nations helping developing countries' trade-deficit problems.

The

Compensatory Financing Facility, which was introduced in 1963 to finance
temporary reductions in export earnings, has been suggested as the agency to
be used in such a solution.

IMF member states with surpluses would pay a

substantial part of their surpluses to fund the facility.

The fund could then

be used by the LOCs facing trade-deficit problems (Korner 177). This solution
must accompany a plan which would help LOCs boost exports permanently.
The Brady plan has been the first attempt to use these trade surpluses to
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help the LOGs with Japan agreeing to supply 4.5 billion dollars under the plan
to bolster IMF and World Bank assistance.

The Brady Plan is also gaining

recognition for being the first plan to offer debt forgiveness.

To reduce the

$350 billion mountain of Latin debt, Brady asked banks to forgive some loans
in exchange for binding guarantees that the rest of the money will be repaid.
Brady's plan urges banks to work out deals on a case-by-case basis, but
provides bankers with sketched out guidelines.
all of the LOGs but targets Latin America.

Brady's proposal applies to

Mexico will be the first country

to negotiate a deal under the plan with, Venezuela, the Philippines and Costa
Rica next.

There has been some skepticism of the Brady plan by those who feel

the LOGs are beginning to wait in line for assistance from the US commercial
banks.

These skeptics feel that debt assistance and forgiveness will be

limited and policies which have more specific details of who gets what are
needed.

The Brady plan is still considered a step in the right direction for

it includes debt-forgiveness, which is something that no other plan has
included.
Previous to the Brady plan, in 1985, was the Baker plan, in which, then
Secretary of State James Baker, called for the IMF and World Bank to join with
the commercial banks to provide an additional 29 billion dollars in new loans
to struggling LOGs.

The countries receiving additional loans were to

undertake comprehensive adjustment programs to reduce inflation and promote
growth.

Secretary Baker believed new lending would generate the growth needed

to reduce the burden of debt-service payments and asked
to adopt specific targets for new lending.

the commercial banks

The targets for new lending,

however, were not met by commercial banks, and in some cases, bank claims on
debtor nations were actually reduced.

Then, in 1987, some of the major
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commercial banks, led by Citicorp, set aside larger loan loss reserves against
their exposure to the debtor countries.

This was a signal from the banks that

they did not intend to support the Baker Plan.

Debt forgiveness was not

mentioned in this plan which was criticized for subjecting commercial banks to
more unwanted risk.
Perhaps additional loans to some LOCs do not add more unwanted risk to
the banks' loan portfolios, but rather increase the long run probability of
loan repayment.

It is these countries that warrant increased bank

involvement. Commercial banks are in need of more information concerning the
LOCs' debt-servicing position

in order to make these lending decisions.

Two previous econometric studies on debt-servicing capacity have provided
a framework for the model presented here.

The first study, by Frank and

Cline, was an application of discriminant analysis for measurement of debt
servicing capacity.

The study attempted to identify the variables which are

important in classifying a country as a default country (risky) or non,default
country (non-risky).

Frank and Cline included the following variables: a debt

service ratio (the ratio of debt-service to exports); the growth rate of
exports; an export fluctuation index; a ratio of "non-compressible"
imports(imports which cannot be eliminated) as a fraction of total imports;
per capita income; the average maturity of loans; cash and foreign exchange
reserves; and a ratio of imports to gross national product.

Out of these

variables Frank and Cline found only three variables significant at the 5%
level: the debt-service ratio, average maturity of loans and the import
reserve ratio.

This study included data for 26 countries over a nine year

period for a total of 234 observations but because of missing data the number
10
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of observations was reduced to 145.
number of Type II errors was 15.

The number of Type I errors was 3 and the

Type I errors occur when the model

classifies a country as non-default when it is actually a default, while Type
II errors occur when the model predicts that a non-default country will be
part of the default

population.

Overall Frank and Cline had a 12.4%

prediction error.
Although this model had a relatively small margin of error, there are
criticisms of the theoretical framework of the model.

Feder and Just, in

their study of debt-servicing capacity, argue that discriminant analysis is
not an appropriate method to measure debt-servicing capacity and suggest that
a logit model is better suited.

They argue that, while discriminant analysis

assumes two completely different populations, the logit approach assumes a
discrete event takes place after the combined effect of certain economic
variables reaches some threshold.

That is, it makes more sense to claim that

in a specific period the country was pushed beyond a critical level leading to
a rescheduling, than to claim that the country suddenly becomes a member of
another class.
Feder and Just use nine economic indicators in their work but, to
facilitate a brief discussion of them, seven are defined the same as in the
Frank and Cline study.

The two additional indicators used are capital inflows

and growth of per capita domestic product. Non-compressible imports used in
the Frank and Cline study was omitted on theoretical grounds.

The usual

argument is that consumption of some imports which are not vital necessities
(compressible imports) can be curtailed temporarily to increase foreign
exchange

for debt-servicing purposes.

Therefore a high percentage of

compressible imports will lead to a lower probability of debt-servicing
11
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difficulty.

Feder and Just argue that the possibilities for reducing imports

may depend on a governments internal political status rather than on the
economic importance of import items.

Thus the measure of compressible imports

will not be adequate until an approach to including political status is
developed.

Feder and Just found five variables to be important in measuring

debt-servicing capacity which include: the import reserve ratio;

the debt

service ratio; the amortization ratio; export growth; and per capita income.
The Feder and Just model had a total of 238 data observations and had a lower
margin of error than the previous Frank and Cline study with only one Type I
error and seven Type II errors.
Although both of these models have a relatively low margin of error with
most of the variables significant, the model presented in this paper will
attempt to improve upon these previous models by including additional
important variables which
of the studies include
structural make-up

are left out of the two previous studies.

Neither

a variable which would take into account the

of an economy.

The model presented here will include the

variable % of agricultural exports to total exports to account for the
structure of a country's economy.

By including this, the affect of a more

industrialized economy on the riskiness of a country's outstanding debt can be
estimated.

This model will also include a variable which will account for

Mexico's announcement of default in 1982 and the following "bandwagon" effect
that resulted.

After Mexico's announcement of default, forty additional

countries announced the need for rescheduling.

This suggests that perhaps

some countries were more inclined to seek rescheduling after Mexico's success
in rescheduling in 1982.

12
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Section III:

Model

In order to estimate the risk associated with a country's debt, several
variables and their estimated effects on the risk will be examined in this
study.
ratio.

The most commonly used indicator in assessing risk is the debt-service
The debt-service ratio is the ratio of debt-service

exports.

payments to

It is important in that any shortfall of foreign exchange earnings

in the current account balance must be financed with either additional
borrowing (capital import), or exchange reserves.
borrowing is not a favorable

Assuming that additional

choice and exchange reserves are rather limited,

the shortage in foreign exchange earnings must be met by a reduction in
imports. Significant import reduction, in many countries ,is difficult due to
the fact that much of the imports in LOCs are used for development and
investment projects. Therefore the higher the debt-service ratio the higher
the probability of default.
A second variable related to the debt-service ratio is the growth ,of
exports.

Growing export markets

increase the probability

will increase foreign exchange earnings and

that a country will be able to meet its current

service obligations by using these increased foreign exchange earnings.

For

countries with large trade-deficits increasing exports will help close these
trade gaps and reduce the amount of import reduction necessary to meet a
shortfall in exchange earnings.

Therefore the higher the growth in exports

the lower the probability of default.
A country's official reserves are also important in estimating the
probability of default because they measure a country's ability to pay without
borrowing.

Reserves include foreign exchange holdings and the net position of
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the country with the IMF.

The ratio of imports to reserves will be used here

to allow for comparable measures among countries.

The larger the ratio of

imports to reserves the lower the debt-servicing capacity.

This is because a

shortfall in exchange earnings can be financed through reserves rather than
additional borrowing, or import reduction when there are adequate reserves.
The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), as mentioned earlier, has been
shown to have severe effects on debt-service payments.

Whereas the debt

service ratio measures the ratio of debt-service payments to exports and the
import reduction needed to meet these service payments in the absence of
adequate foreign exchange earnings, changes in the LIBOR are used in this
model to account for the effects these changes have on the actual debt-service
payments.

These increases in recent years have been shown to be a tremendous

drain on LOG resources.

Large positive changes in the LIBOR will have an

expected negative impact on debt-servicing capacity.
The percentage of agricultural exports is used to estimate the effects
the structural make-up of an economy has on the riskiness of LOG debt.

As

mentioned earlier, declining export markets for agricultural products
devastated the LOG's trade earnings during the world recession in the early
1980's.

Prices of raw materials have also been declining, worsening their

trade balances.

Thus the higher the percentage of agricultural exports the

more sensitive a country is to external world market developments.
also will be used as a structural proxy for internal development.

The ratio
As

countries develop, their industrial base develops as well, allowing for a more
equal distribution of income and a shift in political power to an industrial
class who brings with it higher wages and social reforms.

The more

industrialized a country becomes the more resistant it is to price slumps and
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declining export markets.

Therefore countries with higher percentages of

agricultural goods to total exports will have a higher probability of default.
Year to year changes in the level of investment

are used here to account

for the degree of capital flight, and to account for the effect of investment
on the development of the LOC's economy.

Negative changes in investment from

year to year will mean stagnant development, and

indicate probable capital

flight; hence a higher probability of default.
Per capita income will be included in this model because it seems likely
that the higher the per capita income, the lower the probability of default.
This is because the higher the level of per capita income the higher the level
of savings and therefore the higher the level of investment.

High levels of

per capita income mean higher government revenues which may be used for
development projects as well.
Finally this model will include a dummy variable taking on the value of
zero until 1982 and from then on taking the value of one.

This dummy variable

is included to account for Mexico's announcement, in 1982, that it would no
longer honor its service payments, and the bandwagon effects this announcement
may have brought with it.
All of the preceding variables can be grouped to form the following
equation:
Zt-

b1(DSR) + b 2 (EXP) + b 3 (Res) +b 4 (LIBOR) +b 6 (%AGR) +
b 7 (INV) + bs(PERCAP) + bg(DUMMY)

where DSR- Debt service ratio
EXP- growth in exports
Res- official reserves
LIBOR- London Interbank Offer Rate
15

%AGR- percentage of agricultural exports
INV- change in investment
PERCAP- per capita income
DUMMY- dummy variable
In this equation
in year t.

Zt

is the variable indicating the presence of a default

It has a value of one for a default and zero otherwise.

The term,

"default," as mentioned earlier, is used when debt is forgiven, rescheduled or
repudiated.

The effect each of the above variables has on the default

probability of a country can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.
The logit method can be used once the preceding equation is statistically
estimated

with the resulting dependent variable z being transformed into an

indicator of the probability of default as shown below:
P- l/(l+e- Z )
where P is the composite indicator of the probability of default, and e is the
base of the natural logarithm.

This probability indicator may vary from zero

(as z approaches negative infinity) to one (as z approaches positive
infinity).
Both cross sectional and time series data are used.

The countries

included in the data sample are listed in exhibit 2 along with the

years of

default observations included. The time series is for the years 1972-1985.
Data sources include the World Banks'

World Tables,

In~ernational

Financial

Statistics. the Wall Street Journal Index, and United States Business
Statistics.
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Section IV:

Results

The table below contains the initial results obtained from the preceding
logit model.

Four out the eight variables have the predicted effects at .05

level of significance.

These include: percentage of agricultural exports,

reserves, investment, and the debt-service ratio.
LOGIT MODEL FOR DEP

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

VARIABLE
NAME

ESTIMATED
COEFFICIENT

Constant
PERCAP
%AGR
ADJRES
LIBOR
INV
DSR
DUMMY
FDEXP

-4.826119
0.003572
0.050434
-0.000514
-0.055577
-0.006515
2.663414
-0.139377
-0.000109

STANDARD
ERROR
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

1.1930)
0.0007)
0.0149)
0.0002)
0.0624)
0.0014)
1.7051)
0.4783)
0.0001)

T-STATISTIC
-4.0452
5.2328
3.3815
-2.8933
-0.8907
-4.5555
1. 5621
-0.2914
-0.8271

Per capita income, although significant, has the wrong predicted sign
which suggests that the conventional belief that lower-income countries are
less credit worthy may be incorrect.

The other four statistically significant

variables all carried the predicted sign.
Curiously, the LIBOR is not only statistically insignificant, but also
carries a negative sign. This suggests that the higher the interest rate on
loans the lower the probability of default.

This not only violates financial

theory, but refutes the claim that rising interest rates caused much of the
debt-servicing difficulty in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

The data in

the sample reveal that, in fact, countries continued to experience debtservicing difficulty even after the decline in interest rates began.

17
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the interest rate on LOC loans does not closely follow world interest rates,
but rather, reflects the risk associated with LOC debt.
The dummy variable in the model which incorporates Mexico's default
announcement in 1982 and the "band wagon effects" this announcement brought
with it is also statistically insignificant.
relatively small data sample
announcement

This could be due to the

used for this model.

After Mexico's

in 1982, 40 additional countries sought additional loans and

rescheduled debt payments.

The data sample, however, includes only a small

proportion of these countries, which could be the cause of this variable's
insignificance.
Also showing
exports.

statistically insignificant was the variable growth of

In later variations of the model, however, when lagged growth of

exports is used, it becomes significant and carries the predicted sign.
The estimated coefficients in the results table have a different
interpretation than they would in an ordinary least squares regression, where
the coefficients tell the unit change in the dependent variable from a unit
change in the given independent variable.

In the logit model, the

coefficients tell the change in the log of the odds of default given,
change in the independent variable.
for per capita income is .003207.

a unit

For example, the estimated coefficient
This means that for a dollar

increase in

per capita income the log of the odds, change by .003207.
The table below gives
obtained the best results.

the slight variant of the original model which
This model includes the variables per capita

income, percentage of agricultural exports, reserves, change in per capita
income, investment, the debt-service ratio, the dummy variable specified
earlier, a one year lagged dependent variable, and a one year lagged change in
18
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exports variable.

All variables in this variation are significant

at a .05

level except the debt-service ratio which is significant at an .075 level.
LOGIT MODEL FOR DEP

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

VARIABLE
NAME

ESTIMATED
COEFFICIENT

Constant
PERCAP
%AGR
ADJRES
FDPERCAP
INV
DSR
DUMMY
LAGDEP
LAGFDEXP

-5.467878
0.003207
0.052034
-0.000501
-0.004205
-0.004943
2.686617
-1.000070
0.936655
-0.005915

STANDARD
ERROR
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

1.1334)
0.0007)
0.0154)
0.0002)
0.0015)
0.0014)
1. 8370)
0.5923)
0.4592)
0.0028)

T-STATISTIC
-4.8243
4.7196
3.3862
-2.9040
-2.8170
-3.4419
1.4625
-1. 6885
2.0397
-2.1091

The dummy variable is significant but has the wrong predicted sign.
Again, this could be due to the small data sample which only contained a small
number of the total defaults during this period.
Per capita income is again significant

with the wrong predicted sign,

however, the change in per capita income is significant with the expected
sign.

This, again, suggests that it is not only the lower income countries

that are experiencing debt-servicing difficulty, but the higher income
countries that are experiencing a decline in income as well.
The lagged dependent variable included in this variant is significant
with the predicted sign.
country defaults in

It has a positive sign, which indicates that if a

a given year, the probability of default for the

following year is also higher.
Although significant variables are important in judging the models
performance, the best indicator of the model's performance is its success in
predicting the occurrence and absence of rescheduling.
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Unfortunately, the

•
overall predictive power of a logit model is more difficult to determine than
in the case of a normal ordinary least squares regression analysis, in which
the "adjusted R squared" represents the total variation
variable explained by the model.

In measuring the predictive power of a logit

model, it is first necessary to transform the estimated
default,

into a probability.

in the dependent

"z", the log odds of

It is then necessary to choose a threshold

probability, above which the model has predicted default, and below which it
has not.

The first step merely entails transforming the model's estimates of

"z" for each data observation into probabilities.
are obtained, a threshold

Once these probabilities

value must then be determined.

approach is simply to choose .5

One possible

as the critical threshold.

If the models

estimated probability exceeds .5 it has predicted default, while if it lower
than .5 it has predicted non-default.

This approach, however, would lead to

an extremely unbalanced distribution of errors with only

a small percentage

of non-default cases wrongly predicted (Type I error), but practically all of
the default cases wrongly predicated as

non-default (Type II error.) ,

The approach taken here resembles the established tradition of choosing a
critical probability threshold which results in a relatively
rate of error for the two types of errors.
so that

equal percentage

That is, the threshold

is chosen

not all of the error is concentrated in one direction or other.

While this is a common method of measuring a logit model's predictive power,
its fault lies in that the model's estimates are used in determining its own
predictive power.

The coefficients estimated are not the true coefficients

and may contain errors which will affect the models predicted probabilities.
This in turn may result in the threshold probability being biased.

Due to the

characteristics of the data sample used for this model, however, this method
20

..
seems appropriate.

The large imbalance of default observations (36) as

compared to non-default observations (433) warrants this approach.
The critical threshold that best minimizes the distribution of error in
this particular model is 0.17.

Any predicted probability higher than .17 is a

predicted default while anything lower is a non-default prediction.

Using

this threshold for prediction the regression in Exhibit 4 correctly explained
approximately 88% of non-default cases, and 82% of default cases.

Overall all

the model predicted 87% of all observations correctly which is comparable to
the error rates of the previously discussed models.
A closer analysis of the model's wrongly predicted cases reveals that a
good deal of the models' errors were concentrated in three countries.

The

model's errors for Bolivia, Peru, and Zambia, account for 40% of the model's
total errors.

In the case of Peru the model does show a trend that would

indicated debt-servicing difficulty, however, the models' estimated
probabilities did not reach the critical threshold value of .2 in the actual
event of default.

The model had similar problems with Bolivia.

It did, as

with the case of Peru, show a definite trend towards debt-servicing
difficulty, however, the models predicated probabilities did not

reach the

critical threshold until one year following the actual event of default.
Although the model wrongly predicted the occurrence of a default in a number
of cases for these countries, it was correct in showing the trend toward debt
servicing difficulty.
With the case of Zambia the model did not perform as well.

It predicted

default for the years 1975-1985, but in actuality, Zambia had no instances of
default or debt-servicing difficulty in the years included in the data sample.
The model was completely inaccurate in predicating cases of default.
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Perhaps

..
there is a" lack of data concerning Zambia's reschedulings, or perhaps Zambia
has support from another country in meeting its debt obligations.

Notice in

Exhibit 1 that Zambia's debt is only worth 18 cents on the dollar which
indicates that it is perceived as a credit risk, even though it has never
needed debt rescheduling.

Further research should look at Zambia's political

and economic position in order to better explain the model's completely
inaccurate predictions for this country.

If the faulty predictions for these

preceding countries are excluded, the error rate for the model becomes 8%.

Section V:

Conclusion

In sum, the results obtained in this study, support most of the
hypotheses presented.

The key influences on the probability of LDC default

are, changes in per capita income, percentage of agricultural exports, reserve
levels, investment levels, the debt-service ratio, previous events of default,
and the previous years change in exports.

Obviously, these are not

th~

only

influences affecting the LDCs' ability to meet debt obligations, however,
these influences found significant could provide guidelines for policy makers
attempting to enact economic programs that will enhance the probabilities of
LDC loan repayment.

Political structures

and other country specific

variables are not included in this model which limits the models use in such
an area, but nonetheless, the model does suggest general guidelines.

It is

naive to think that all LDCs can be classified as experiencing the same
difficulties, and further research should try and incorporate more country
specific variables in estimating a countries probability of loan repayment.
The accuracy level of the model does confirm the belief that objective
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risk assessment for LOG loans is possible and can provide bankers with
relatively accurate estimates of the probability
able to meet its debt obligations in a given year.

that a given country will be
The nature of the model

prohibits long-term probability estimations, except in cases where accurate
levels of the significant independent variables can be determined for the
future.

In recent years, short-term loans to countries unable to meet the

service obligations on long-term debt have been very common, and it is in this
case a risk assessment model such as this one would be beneficial.

The model

can also be useful in helping commercial banks predict and prepare for
potential disruptions in the expected performance of their LOG loan
portfolios.

Necessary loan loss reserves and similar precautionary measures,

along with secondary market values of LOG debt, could be more accurately
determined using the information this model provides.
This research was in no wayan attempt to discourage further bank
involvement in the LOG crisis, but was merely an attempt to provide banks with
more information concerning their LOG loans. Halting lending to the LOGs is
not a solution to the problem, but more adequate information can help banks in
making lending decisions and provisions.
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Exhibit 1.
Millions of dollars except where noted
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Secondary Market
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia

Debt to
financial
institutions

Bid
price
dollars
47
10

2()395.3

126.3
49624.7
12084.8
4144.2

55

67
81

Costa Rica
Dominican RepLlbl i c
Ecuador
Gabon
Guatemala

1530.4
328.4
4972.5
532

42
45
82

101. 1

72

Honduras
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Liberia
Malawi

164.8
2486.6
406.5
41.4
53.7

38
60

Me:·: ico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Panama

37

5
74

58757.3
2568
1144.9
6515.2
1877.6

Peru
Philippines
Romania
Senegal
Sudan

3224.6
4206.6
2261.4

Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia

1300.5
9968.2
4510.3
402.9

Total

33

53
65.5
5
28
64

11
67
87
61

233.5
553.6

..,
"'-

68
67
70
24.5
18

226.5

Total
value
9585.8
12.6
27293.6
8096.8
3356.8

505
137.9
2237.6
436.2
72.8
62.6
1492
150.4·
2. 1
39.7
31141.4
1682
57.2
1824.3
1201.7
354.7
2818.4
1967.4
142.4
11. 1
884.3
6678.7
3157.2
98.7
40.8
105542.3

194743.8
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Exhibit 2.
Countries Included in Logit Analysis
Along with Years of Default Observations

1.

Algeria

16. Morocco 1983

2.

Argentina 1976,82,83,84

17. Nigeria 1983

3.

Bolivia 1981,83

18. Pakistan

4.

Brazil 1982,83

19. Peru 1976,78,79,83,84

5.

Chile 1972,74,75,83,84

20. Philippines 1983

6.

Colombia

21. Portugal

7.

Ecuador 1982,84

22. Sudan 1979,81,82

8.

Egypt

23. Syria

9.

Greece

24. Thailand

10. Indonesia

25. Tunisia

11. India

26. Turkey 1978,79,80,82

12. Israel

27. Venezuela 1982,83,84

13. Korea

28. Yugoslavia 1983,84

14. Malaysia

29. Zaire 1976,77,79,80,81,83,84

15. Mexico 1982,84,85

30. Zambia

25
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Exhibit 3.
Variable Name
Per Cap
%Agr
Res
FDPerCap

Estimated Coefficient

INV
Dwnmy

-

LagDep
LagExp

-

0.003207
0.052034
0.000501
0.004205
0.004943
1.000070
0.936655
0.005915

Anti-Log*
1.007
1.127
0.999
1.009
0.988
0.099
8.642
0.986

* The anti-log of the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the change
in the odds of default for a unit change of the corresponding variable.
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